Yet since such competition often leads parties to grasp for state resources to gain a competitive edge, how can it prompt political actors to protect the state? Such competition is critical in new democracies, as the development of post-communist states shows. The Myth of Democratic Failure. Berkeley: University of California Press; North, Douglass, and Weingast, Barry. Party Strategies of Survival The state is an inevitable target of governing parties seeking material assets. Similarly, the determinants of organizational resources range from the parties ideology for example, communist and social democratic parties have traditionally emphasized extensive local presence to the availability of campaign techniques for instance, nineteenth-century mass parties sought to mobilize swathes of voters for elections.
The Regeneration of the Communist Successor Parties in East Central Europe. Such cases further isolate the causal mechanisms by which robust competition constrains state exploitation. Although market economies and electoral democracies are pervasive in the region, the record of state-building is mixed. Economic, Legal, and Political Dimensions of Competition. Her first book, Redeeming the Communist Past, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2002.
However, differences in political competition explain why democracy alone could not stop state exploitation, and why some parties were more constrained than others. First, it challenges our understanding of post-communist pathways. Why do some governing parties limit their opportunistic behavior and constrain the extraction of private gains from the state? Bulgaria, Latvia, and Slovakia tend to receive considerably lower rankings, with the Czech Republic and Poland in the middle, changing places from year to year the dataset aggregated think tank and expert surveys in 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 135— 73. Documentary sources comprise transcripts of party congresses, parliamentary committee meetings where available , and parliamentary sessions. Raiser, Martin, Di Tommaso, Maria, and Weeks, Melvyn.
In short, parliamentary questions were both an indicator of the vigor of the opposition and 32 33 34 35 12 Ferejohn, John. These cases were chosen on the basis of variation in existing indicators of competition, which ought to have correlated with state exploitation. They delayed or enfeebled formal state institutions of oversight and regulation, and expanded the discretionary uncontrolled and unmonitored sector of state administration such as extrabudgetary funds or state institutions removed from public oversight. See, for example, Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 October 1993, 11 July 2002; Respekt, 22 January 1996. Public opinion polls and World Bank governance rankings reveal a similar pattern.
See the scandals that broke out in the Czech press in 1996—8 and in Slovakia in 1998—9. Nor did they simply prey on the state, extracting as much as possible without building new state institutions of public good provision. The other cluster is led by Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia, and includes Lithuania and Poland. Across the post-communist democracies, governing parties have opportunistically reconstructed the state — simultaneously exploiting it by extracting state resources and building new institutions that further such extraction. Parties documented the number of questions their representatives had asked and how they forced the governments to account for themselves. This anticipatory mechanism arose very early in Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia: During the negotiations in the last days of communism, pragmatic communist parties and determined opposition representatives developed numerous institutional channels for parliamentary participation. .
Bulgaria Romania Croatia Montenegro Serbia Macedonia Albania Bosnia Georgia Moldova Ukraine Armenia Russia Kosovo Azerbaijan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Belarus Turkmenistan 1. Robust competition parties are also plausible as governing parties. Only robust party competition itself hampered state exploitation. This is not to say that parties do not wish to win elections and dominate the electoral arena; rather, they are unwilling to subvert the rules of the game to do so. Several explanations could account for the subsequent variation in exploitation, but these do not adequately explain the observed differences. Why, then, do we not see a stronger correlation among state, market, and democracy? Public demands, international pressures, and 42 18 Fish, M. They are not the only force around which robust competition emerges, as Estonia shows — but they were able to spur the other parties as few could.
New York, Harper and Row; Aldrich, John. It was this institutional access, rather than either partisan coalitions or electoral mobilization, that allowed some churches to become so powerful. An Economic Theory of Democracy. In most post-communist countries, however, where robust competition existed, it did so thanks largely to the reinvented communist successor parties: former authoritarian rulers who successfully transformed themselves into moderate and professional democratic competitors. There have been notable exceptions of revolutionary episodes. Third, robust competition induces governing parties to share power, and to coopt their critics as much as possible. Where the opposition was vague, implausible, and uncritical, governing parties more freely exploited the state, both by directly obtaining resources and by building in enormous discretion to extract in the future.
On the one hand, intense competition creates incentives for parties to grab resources to ensure their future success. Defeating Dominance: Opposition Party Building and Mexicos Democratization in Comparative Perspective. The one country where a president played a more powerful role was Poland — but his powers were severely circumscribed, and the position made largely ceremonial, by 1995. I gathered the data on establishment and functioning of each of these institutions from the parliamentary records of laws proposed and passed, as well as from domestic media reports. Early competition thus set, but did not determine, the trajectories of state emergence.
Expanding the state administration is then a strategy of extending the scope of party control over state resources. The second choice is that of the equipment with which this game will be played: whether or not parties will build the extensive organizational networks that allow them to pursue labor-intensive mobilization in either democratic or nondemocratic settings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Zielonka, Jan. They enfeebled or delayed formal state institutions of monitoring and oversight, established new discretionary structures of state administration, and extracted enormous informal profits from the privatization of the communist economy. And, with their scarce members and meager resources, these new parties could not hope to survive by encapsulating electorates, á la mass parties, or by disbursing selective incentives via clientelism.